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THE NEW LEVIATHAN 
Dennis Patterson* 
THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES: WAR, PEACE, AND THE COURSE OF 
HISTORY. By Philip Bobbitt. New York: Knopf. 2002. Pp. xxxii, 919. 
$40.00. 
Good is an empty space into which human choice may move. 
- Iris Murdoch1 
Reputation in any field is an elusive phenomenon: part notoriety, 
part honor, part fame, part critical assessment.2 Even in legal scholar­
ship it has an uneven, unpredictable quality. It is hard to imagine a 
book by a law professor that has had more immediate impact on world 
leaders than Philip Bobbitt's The Shield of Achilles.3 Much of the 
national-security strategy devised by the U.S. administration after the 
September 11 attacks expresses ideas Bobbitt conceived long before;4 
* Distinguished Professor, School of Law (Camden) and Department of Philosophy 
(New Brunswick), Rutgers University; Visiting Fellow (2002-03), Department of Politics 
(Madison Program), Princeton University. J.D., Ph.D. (Philosophy) 1980, University at Buf­
falo, State U niversity of New York - Ed. Thanks to Ari Afilalo, Michael Carrier, Anne 
Dalesandro, Mary Eckhardt, Kim Ferzan, Richard Hyland, Michael Livingston, Tom 
Morawetz, Andrew Moravcsik, Patrick S. O'Donnell, Ralf Poscher, Rand Rosenblatt, Ray 
Solomon, and Jefferson White for generous and helpful comments on drafts of this Review. 
Special thanks to Ron Collins. Thanks also to my research assistants, Alyson Jones and 
Daniella Gordon. 
1. IRIS MURDOCH, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF GOOD 97 (1970). 
2. Consider: In 1940, with his reputation in eclipse, Scott Fitzgerald died in Los Angeles. 
The poet Stephen Vincent Benet wrote an appreciation, which ended: "You can take off 
your hats now, gentlemen, and I think perhaps you had better. This is not a legend, this is a 
reputation - and, seen in perspective, it may well be one of the most secure reputations of 
our time." Stephen Vincent Benet, Fitzgerald's Unfinished Symphony, 24 SATURDAY REV. 
LITERATURE, Dec. 6, 1941, at 10 (book review). 
3. Professor of Law, University of Texas Law School. 
4. The White House writes: 
Defending our Nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the 
Federal Government. Today, that task has changed dramatically. Enemies in the past 
needed great armies and great industrial capabilities to endanger America. Now, shadowy 
networks of individuals can bring great chaos and suffering to our shores for less than it costs 
to purchase a single tank. 
THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2002), avail­
able at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nssintro.html (last visited July 22, 2003). 
In Achilles, Bobbitt wrote: 
For five centuries, it has taken the resources of a state to destroy another state: only states 
could muster the huge revenues, conscript the vast armies, and equip the divisions requited 
to threaten the survival of other states . . . .  We are entering a period, however, when small 
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and from a different point on the political spectrum is the Archbishop 
of Canterbury,5 whose televised nationwide address in January explic­
itly took the book as its text. The British Foreign Secretary, the E.U. 
Commissioner for External Relations, and the international security 
advisor to the Secretary General of the E.U. have all made speeches 
that draw on Bobbitt's ideas.6 In January of 2003, the Guardian news­
paper stated that "among [the] powerful, one book has become 
required reading."7 This established British liberal voice echoed the 
suggestion by the American conservative National Review that "[t]his 
book - with its masterly reappraisal of modern history and subtle 
el.ucidation of today's geopolitics - should be on every desk in the 
State Department,"8 .and its conservative companion the Weekly 
Standard recommended that it "should become required reading not 
only in the academy but for the military and civilian decision-makers 
of the industrialized world."9 For all this, Bobbitt's book is likelier to 
have more influence than renown; as with his earlier works, which 
numbers of persons, operating with the enormous power of modern computers, biogenetics, 
air transport and even small nuclear weapons, can deal lethal blows to any society ... . [and] 
the origin of these attacks can be effectively disguised . . . .  Furthermore, an adversary state 
might well want to shield itself from retaliation by operating . . .  through shadowy agents 
posing as terrorists or acting through the infinitely extendable arms of the Internet. 
Pp. xxi, 811-12. 
And the White House writes: 
As we defend the peace, we will also take advantage of an historic opportunity to preserve 
the peace. Today, the international community has the best chance since the rise of the na­
tion-state in the seventeenth century to build a world where great powers compete in peace 
instead of continually prepare for war. Today, the world's great powers find ourselves on the 
same side - united by common dangers of terrorist violence and chaos. 
THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, supra. 
In Achilles, Bobbitt wrote: 
The September attacks on the US provide that country with an historic opportunity . . .  the 
moment and the context in which to organize a grand coalition of states . . . .  
. . . States that otherwise might find themselves in violent competition can take this opportu­
nity to cooperate in a new security structure .. . : all are subject to attacks by a [global ter­
rorist network] because [such a network] is the neighbor of all. 
Pp. 819, 822. 
5. Rowan Williams, Dimbleby Lecture (Dec. 19, 2002) ("This reading of our present 
situation is spelled out in great detail by the American strategist and historian Philip Bob­
bitt."), available at http://www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/sermons_speeches/021219.html 
(last visited July 22, 2003). 
6. Jack Straw, Lord Mayor's Lecture (Nov. 13, 2002), available at 
http://www.britainonline.org.pk/highcomm/downloads/13nov.pdf; Robert Cooper, Grand 
Strategy, PROSPECT, Dec. 1, 2002; Chris Patten, Friends Across Water, GUARDIAN, May 18, 
2002, at 8 (book review); Prime Minister Rani! Wickremesinghe, Making Our People Rich, 
HINDU, (Aug. 25, 2003), available at http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu//2003/08/25/ 
stories/2003082501601000.htm. 
7. Michael Howard, Best Get Used to War, GUARDIAN, Jan. 13, 2003. 
8. Michael Knox Beran, Soldiers of the State, NAT'L REV .. Sept. 30, 2002, at 45, 47. 
9. Fred Siegel, War Matters, WKLY. STANDARD, Aug. 26-Sept. 2, 2002, at 36-37. 
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have reshaped a number of fields, he remains, in the U.S. at least, the 
most influential person of whom you have never heard. 
Bobbitt's credentials for delivering a work of such far-reaching in­
fluence are matched by few scholars. He worked for two decades in 
government and academia,10 and has written on topics as diverse as 
decision theory,11 nuclear weapons strategy,12 and constitutional 
theory.13 He has long been regarded, even by his severest critics, as a 
strikingly original thinker.14 Those who look to Achilles for examples 
of this originality will not be disappointed. Surprising analysis and dis­
cussion abound. Bobbitt shows the relationship between Hans 
Kelsen's work15 and Wittgenstein's Tractatus; he offers a theory of the 
origin of international law in constitutional law - contrary to that 
espoused by Kelsen (pp. 586-92); we are given a new definition of an 
old term, the "constitutional order," and Bobbitt describes the term's 
unique basis in legitimacy, which he also says accounts for the "specia­
tion" of such orders (p. 346; passim); there is an original monograph 
on Colonel House, Woodrow Wilson's trusted friend and advisor (pp. 
367-410); and he develops a new application in the area of foreign 
policy for social-psychology work done in the late 1960s. All this is in 
addition to his novel, central thesis that innovations in warfare and 
10. In addition to university teaching in the U.S. and U.K., he has served both Demo­
cratic and Republican administrations and has held various posts at the National Security 
Council ("NSC"), the Department of State, and the White House, and served as Legal 
Counsel to the Senate Select Committee on the Iran-Contra Affair. See 
http://www.utexas.edu/law/faculty/pbobbitt/ (last visited July 22, 2003). Until mid-June of 
1999, he was the Senior Director for Strategic Planning at the NSC. Prior to holding that 
post, he was Senior Director for Critical Infrastructure having previously been Director for 
Intelligence at the NSC. From 1990-93, Bobbitt was Counselor on International Law for the 
Department of State. Id. He was Legal Counsel to the Senate Select Committee on the Iran­
Contra Affair (1987) and the principal author of the report, COVERT ACTION AND THE 
CONSTITUTION; and Associate Counsel to the President (1980-81). Id. 
1 1. See GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978) (hereinafter 
TRAGIC CHOICES]. 
12. PHILIP BOBBITT, DEMOCRACY AND DETERRENCE: THE HISTORY AND FUTURE OF 
NUCLEAR STRATEGY (1988) (hereinafter DEMOCRACY AND DETERRENCE]; US NUCLEAR 
STRATEGY: A READER (Philip Bobbitt et al. eds., 1988). 
13. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1984) 
[hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL FATE]; PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION (I 991) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION]. 
1 4. See Mark Tushnet, Justification in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 TEXAS L. REV. 
1707, 1707 (1994). 
Id. 
Roughly speaking, scholars of constitutional law fall into two groups. First there are the 
celebrated scholars who either restate approaches taken by an earlier generation . . .  or re­
package ideas developed by other scholars . . . .  Then there are original scholars. Philip Bob­
bitt is an original scholar. Thus my dichotomy suggests that the insights in his work are likely 
to be ignored or transformed by the larger scholarly community. 
1 5. P. 873 n.34 (citing Hans Kelsen, Centralization and Decentralization, in AUTHORITY 
AND THE INDIVIDUAL 210, 239 (1937)). 
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revolutions in the constitutional order interact such that neither occurs 
without fundamentally affecting the other - with all its implications 
for our current constitutional system. 
There is a complex sensibility at work in Achilles16 consistent with 
that displayed in Bobbitt's previous works. It takes a certain cast of 
mind and temperament to go against the grain of received opinion. In 
every subject to which he has turned his attention, Bobbitt puts in 
question the terms of debate and recasts the discussion. It is this qual­
ity of mind that makes all his work - but especially Achilles - so 
instructive. 
The simplest explanation for the wide interest in Achilles is the 
degree to which recent events fall in line with a scenario that was envi­
sioned by Bobbitt years before they unfolded in New York, Washing­
ton, and the skies over Western Pennsylvania.17 Many said the world 
changed that hellish day. If Bobbitt is right, the world had already 
changed: September 11 was but a wakeup call. 
Achilles opens with this statement of prologue: 
We are at a moment in world affairs when the essential ideas that govern 
statecraft must change. For five centuries it has taken the resources of a 
state to destroy another state: only states could muster the huge reve­
nues, conscript the vast armies, and equip the divisions required to 
threaten the survival of other states. Indeed, posing such threats, and 
meeting them, created the modern state. In such a world, every state 
16. Achilles is composed of two Books. In Book I ("State of War"), Bobbitt makes three 
arguments. First is the thesis of the Long War, the epochal war of the twentieth century. 
Second, Bobbitt employs the concept of an "epochal war" to describe the evolution of the 
State over the course of the last five hundred years. The third argument is that we are en­
tering a period where the constitutional order will be altered by new forms of warfare. The 
main themes of Book I are the relationship of law to strategy, the definition of a constitu­
tional order, the idea of a market-state, and the notion of an epochal war. Book II ("States 
of Peace") describes the "society of states" about which Bobbitt also makes three argu­
ments. First, the constitution of the present society of states was written at Versailles and is 
incapable of coping with twenty-first century challenges. Second, constitutions for the soci­
ety of states are always written at peace conferences, which occur at the end of epochal wars. 
Finally, a society of market-states has multiple futures. Bobbitt explores three possible fu­
tures for the society of market-states. The book concludes with a poignant and moving Post­
script, written after the events of September 1 1 .  Interspersed throughout the book are eight­
een poems, including works by Homer, Philip Larkin, W.H. Auden, Joseph Brodsky, John 
Milton, Wislawa Szymborska, and two by Czeslaw Milosz, a favorite. See Philip Bobbitt, 
Philip Bobbi/l's Favourite Books on International Affairs, GUARDIAN (noting Milosz as one 
of Bobbitt's favorite authors), available at http://books.guardian.co.uk/toplOs/topl0/0,6109, 
743857,00.html (last visited July 10, 2003). 
Id. 
17. Edward Rothstein, Seeing the New Era Before 911 I, N.Y. TIMES, June 1 ,  2002, at B9. 
[N)o one could have guessed at the kinds of traumas and transformations that were about to 
unfold [after September 11th). But judging from this book - which after a decade of work, 
must have been all but complete at the time - the historian Philip Bobbitt had a pretty good 
idea . . . .  Mr. Bobbitt's evolutionary map of warfare's impact on the state foreshadows the 
kinds of events still unfolding. What has happened since - even last week's announcement 
that Russia is now affiliated with its onetime nemesis, NA TO - fits eerily well with his 
speculations. 
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knew that its enemy would be drawn from a small class of potential ad­
versaries. This is no longer true, owing to advances in international tele­
communications, rapid computation, and weapons of mass destruction. 
The changes in statecraft that will accompany these developments will be 
as profound as any that the State has thus far undergone. (p. xxi) 
The persuasiveness of Bobbitt's thesis - that the State as we know 
it is undergoing a fundamental transformation - is given convincing 
support by his analysis of the entire history of the modern State in 
relation to five "epochal wars" which give rise to five different consti­
tutional orders. His analysis of the State's legitimacy and legitimation 
is "topological"; constant among the five changes in the constitutional 
order is an interplay between strategy, law, and history.18 This inter­
play has determined legitimacy over the course of the last five 
hundred years, periodically resulting in the demise of one form of the 
State and the institution of a new one.19 As each epochal war is con­
cluded,20 legitimacy is real.ized by the triumphant new constitutional 
order21 and is then ratified at a peace conference that settles the con­
stitutional form for the newly constituted society of states. The ques­
tion for our time is: What war - and what peace - will someday be 
seen as having accomplished the same sort of fundamental change in 
the constitution of contemporary international society by legitimizing 
the market-state?" (p. 484), which Bobbitt sees as the new emerging 
constitutional order. 
18. In his view, "there is no State without strategy, Jaw and history, and . . .  these three 
are not merely interrelated elements, they are elements each composed . . .  of the other[)." 
P. 6. 
19. The Princely State ( 151 5-1555) provides an example, 
of a strategic imperative animating a constitutional innovation - an instance, that is, where 
the insistent question of security in a specific context (geography, wealth, small population) 
yields a new legal solution and requires a story to rationalize that solution. If the constitu-
. tional innovation of the Modern State was in part a response to the threat posed by mobile 
artillery to the walled cities of Italy, the precise shape of that response - the princely state 
- was not governed by strategic considerations alone. but also by the felt need to ensure le­
gitimacy for the leadership that wedded its future to this new creation. 
P. 83. 
20. Five forms of the State and their accompanying epochal wars mark the metamor­
phoses of the State: Princely State (Habsburg-Valois Wars) 1515- 1555; Kingly State (Thirty 
Years' War) 1618-1648; Territorial State (Wars of Louis XIV) 1667-1713; State-Nation 
(Wars of the French Revolution) 1792-1815; Nation-State (The Long War) 1914-1990. 
P. 346. 
21 .  The legitimacy of the State has been the subject of philosophical speculation since 
antiquity. Legitimacy - the right of the State to command allegiance and exercise a monop­
oly on violence - is conventionally tied to sovereignty. Nowhere is this more evident than 
modernity where the first great theorist of the state - Hobbes - grounded the allegiance of 
individuals to the State in an irrevocable covenant between the State and its citizens. Bobbitt 
eschews a pure philosophical approach to the question of legitimacy and shows that legiti­
macy is best thought of as an historical achievement; a unique fusion of strategy and law. 
This is why bringing strategy together with statecraft and law marks a development in the 
theory of legitimacy. As Bobbitt puts it, "history is the medium by which the legitimacy of 
the constitutional structure is married to the success of the strategy of the state." P. 207. 
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The last constitutional order achieved victory over its competitors 
in 1990, after the most recent epochal war that Bobbitt denominates 
the "Long War."22 This ended with the demise of fascism and commu­
nism and the triumph of parliamentary democracy. Shortly after the 
collapse of the former Soviet Union, some claimed that with the 
triumph of democracy the history of the State ended.23 Bobbitt thinks 
otherwise. It was the history of the nation-state that ended. The legiti­
macy of the current constitutional order - the nation-state - is in 
irreversible decline. But the nation-state is only the most recent consti­
tutional order. Bobbitt is clear that the State will not go away, but its 
nature will change so thoroughly that its statecraft will be rendered 
obsolete.24 Nation-states will be replaced by market-states,25 and 
changes in the nature of the State will be accompanied by new forms 
22. The "Long War" encompassed World War I, the Bolshevik Revolution, the Spanish 
Civil War, the Second World War, the Korean and Viet Nam wars, and the Cold War. One 
of the most thoughtful commentators on Achilles is Paul Hirst. He takes issue with Bobbitt's 
Long War thesis. See Paul Hirst, Hirst on Bobbitt, OPEN DEMOCRACY, JULY 7, 2002, at 
http://www.opendemocracy.net/debates/article.jsp?id=3&debateld=77&articleld=690 ("The 
long war only makes sense if, as Bobbitt claims, Germany was a fascist power before World 
War One - bent on world domination and controlled by an authoritarian regime."). For 
criticism of Bobbitt's account of the collapse of the Weimar Republic, see Gopal Balakrish­
nan. Algorithms of War, NEW LEFf REV., Sept./Oct. 2003, at 5, 1 8-20 (reviewing The Shield 
of Achilles). 
23. This thesis is advanced in FRANCIS FUKUY AMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE 
LAST MAN (1993). Bobbitt points out that Hegel made exactly the same sort of "end of 
history" claim for the state-nation at about the moment when its founding history was 
achieving consensus. See p. 215 n. Additionally, "Fukuyama got the end of ideology right, 
but he missed the resurgence of nationalism. He missed Islamic fundamentalism. He imag­
ined that the end of the ideological world of the 20th century would bring a sort of stasis." 
Philip Bobbitt, Bobbitt on Bobbitt, OPEN DEMOCRACY, Apr. 1 1 ,  2002, at http://www.open 
democracy.net/debates/article.jsp?id=3&debateld=77&articleld=733 (last visited Sept. 18, 
2003). 
24. An interesting approach to the changing nature of the State - one which echoes 
themes in Bobbitt's argument - can be found in Robert Cooper, The Post-Modern State, in 
RE-ORDERING THE WORLD 1 1  (Mark Leonard ed., 2002) (comparing states in the modern 
and "postmodern" worlds along the lines of war, security, and statecraft). In his much­
discussed article Power and Weakness (now the book ROBERT KAGAN, OF PARADISE AND 
POWER: AMERICA AND EUROPE IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER (2003)), Robert Kagan places 
Cooper's postmodern Europe in the larger context of U.S. power and global (especially 
European) security. See KAGAN, supra, at 74. 
"The challenge to the postmodern world," Cooper argues. "is to get used to the idea of dou­
ble standards." Among themselves, Europeans may "operate on the basis of laws and open 
cooperative security." But when dealing with the world outside Europe, "we need to revert 
to the rougher methods of an earlier era - force, pn:emptive attack, deception, whatever is 
necessary." This is Cooper's principle for safeguarding society: "Among ourselves, we keep 
the law but when we are operating in the jungle, we must also use the laws of the jungle."· 
Id. (internal citation omitted). This state of affairs is not without difficulties. According to 
Kagan, the United States must "play by the rules of a Hobbesian world . . .  [here] it must 
sometimes act unilaterally, not out of a passion for unilateralism but only because, given a 
weak Europe that has moved beyond power, the United States has no choice but to act uni­
laterally." Id. at 99. 
25. I discuss three possible versions of the market-state. See infra notes 34-35 and ac­
companying text. 
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of warfare.26 War is an inevitable feature of human existence, Bobbitt 
argues.27 We cannot change this fact but we can, with careful planning, 
choose our wars.28 
Why is the legitimacy of the nation-state in decline, and why does 
Bobbitt believe the market-state will take its place? To see this, one 
must appreciate the basis for legitimacy in both these forms, for that is 
what distinguishes constitutional orders from each other. The nation­
state promised to improve the material well-being of its nation and 
made this promise its raison d'etre. Bobbitt identifies five develop­
ments that will make this promise increasingly difficult to fulfill. First 
is an international system of trade and finance that promotes 
exchanges of goods, and talent, and the free movement of capital.29 As 
capital moves from place to place around the globe, seeking the high-
26. Al Qaeda illustrates this development. Bobbitt sees Al Qaeda not as a rogue gang 
but a malignant form of market-state: 
The multinational mercenary terror network that Osama bin Laden .and others have as­
sembled is a malignant and mutated version of the market-state. Like other emerging mar-
.. ket-states, it is a reaction to the strategic developments of the Long War that brought forth 
cultural penetration, the liberalization of trade and finance, and weapons proliferation, on 
an unprecedented scale. Like other states, this network has a standing army; it has a treasury 
and a consistent source of revenue; it has a permanent civil service; it has an intelligence 
collection and analysis cadre; it even runs a rudimentary welfare program for its fighters, and 
their relatives and associates. It has a recognizable hierarchy of officials; it makes alliances 
with other states; it promulgates laws, which it enforces ruthlessly; it declares wars. 
This network, of which Al Qaeda is only a part, greatly resembles a multinational corpo­
ration but that is simply to say that it is a market-state, made possible by advances in interna­
tional telecommunications and transit, rapid computation, and weapons of mass destruction. 
Lacking contiguous territory, Al Qaeda is a kind of virtual state, which means that our clas­
sical strategies of deterrence based on retaliation will have to be rethought. That is another 
way of saying that when Afghanistan is conquered and pacified, the war against terrorism 
will go on. P. 820. 
27. War, Bobbitt writes, 
is not a pathology that, with proper hygiene and treatment, can be wholly prevented. War is 
a natural condition of the State, which was organized in order to be an effective instrument 
of violence on behalf of society. Wars are like deaths, which, while they can be postponed, 
will come when they come and cannot be finally avoided. 
P. 819 (emphasis omitted). 
28. In this regard, Bobbitt describes our choices this way: 
The epochal war we are about to enter will either be a series of low-intensity, information­
guided wars linked by a commitment to re-inforcing world order, or a gradually increasing 
anarchy that leads to intervention at a much costlier level or even a cataclysm of global pro­
portions preceded by a period of relative if deceptive peace. It is ours to choose. 
P. 342. 
29. One harbinger of the transition to the market-state is the phenomenon of "globaliza­
tion." P. 469 ("[G]lobalization has undermined the collectivist values represented by the na­
tion-state and turned attention to the benefit of individuals."). Globalization acts as a cata­
.lyst in "[t]he real shift . . .  from public purposes to private purposes, from a state that takes 
its legitimacy by assuring the common welfare to one that instead relies on providing the 
broadest possible opportunity for the satisfaction of individual interests." P. 470. For Bob­
bitt, "globalization" is merely an epiphenomenon of deeper developments; not a fundamen­
tal driver but a symptom. 
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est return, financial markets and national currencies are subject to 
violent upset, removing from the nation-state the power to control the 
value of its currency.30 Second are threats that do not observe national 
boundaries. Examples of these are environmental threats and diseases 
such as AIDS and SARS. No nation-state alone can protect its nation 
or hide from these transnational threats. Third are threats to the 
national culture. We often hear that with the advent of the Internet 
came a world culture. It is a fairly safe bet that no nation-state can 
limit or meaningfully control citizen access to foreign cultures. The 
fourth development is one of which we need no reminder - weapons 
of mass destruction. Like the threat posed by mobile artillery to the 
walled cities of fifteenth-century Italy,31 the ballistic missile, the suit­
case bomb, and chemical and biological weapons are engendering a 
new constitutional order. These weapons of mass destruction make it 
impossible to defend the nation by defending the perimeters of the 
nation-state. As a result of this development and the increasing disper­
sion of this technology, no nation-state can promise to increase the 
security of the nation by increasing its offensive capabilities: at most it 
can decrease its vulnerability. Fifth, and of particular importance, is 
international law32 and the global system of human rights,33 which 
30. George Soros, who has profited (and lost) mightily wagering against currencies, has 
written three books arguing for reform of global markets. See GEORGE SOROS, THE CRISIS 
OP GLOBAL CAPITALISM: OPEN SOCIETY ENDANGERED (1998); GEORGE SOROS, ON 
GLOBALIZATION (2002); GEORGE SOROS, OPEN SOCIETY: REFORMING GLOBAL 
CAPITALISM (2000). 
31. P. 80 ("Machiavelli, writing in 1 519, said that after 1494, '[n]o wall exists, however 
thick, that artillery cannot destroy in a few days.' Suddenly, walls, towers, moats - all were 
rendered obsolete.'' (internal citation omitted)). 
32. There are conceptual problems with the current approach (the "universal view") to 
international law: 
The universal view of international law is flawed in two important respects (neither having 
much to do, however, with the common criticism that such universal scope must await a uni­
versal morality). First, it mixes the equality of states, a legal concept, with the decision to use 
force, a strategic concept, in a way that is fatal to both, and thus eerily recapitulates the early 
prehistory of the State, which was first constituted out of the separation of these two con­
cepts. Thus it treats the society of states as if it were a society of individuals. 
P. 361 . 
33. The United Nations, Bobbitt argues, is part of the problem. 
The U.N., a second generation of the League [of Nations], has given us a second generation 
of .. . failures, that is, a new wave of crimes shielded by sovereignty .... 
. . . It is instructive . . .  to look closely at how the U.N. has actually managed to succeed 
when it has acted to wage war. It may surprise some to learn that its successes have come 
only because the ideal of a world covenant enforced by a military force has been quickly, if 
quietly, abandoned. 
P. 472 (discussing the U.N. Security Council's handling of the North Korean attack on South 
Korea). 
According to Bobbitt, this will lead to the delegitimation of the U.N.: 
Though the Charter, interpreted as a world covenant of superior Jaw. has been of doubtful 
utility in preventing armed conflict, its most troublesome aspect may lie in peacetime. Very 
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impose legal rules on the nation that have not been ratified by the 
nation-state. But the State will not wither away under these pressures. 
Rather, the basis of its legitimacy will change. Market-states will claim 
power on the grounds that they are the means by which opportunity is 
maximized.34 In the future, our statecraft "must reflect the emergence 
simply, it is not obvious that a universal law-creating system actually based on democratic 
majoritarianism and self-determination is either acceptable or desirable. Nor is the U.N. 
wholly consistent with such a system in any event, owing to the privileged role of the perma­
nent, veto-bearing members of the Security Council. Yet a universal system that professes 
allegiance to the sources of authority of the parliamentary nation-state but denies them in 
fact is of doubtful legitimacy. 
Pp. 474-75. 
And what will take the place of the U. N.? 
When it is replaced by a constitution for a society of market-states, this problem will disap­
pear because that constitution will resemble those of corporations. which allow for weighted 
voting based on wealth. But to adopt such a constitution, we will have to abandon the pre­
tense of a world sovereign: corporations, after all, do not make law. 
P. 475. 
There is, perhaps, no finer example of the U.N.'s continuing inability to solve security 
crises than its handling of Saddam Hussein. Bobbitt writes: 
Saddam Hussein has spent the last twelve years breaching every provision of the Ceasefire 
Agreement that ended the Gulf War. Though required to "unconditionally accept" disar­
mament of his weapons of mass destruction under U N  supervision, he has actively sought to 
acquire such weapons , expelled the inspectors and hidden the WMD he already had. After 
the defection of the head of his biological weapons program in 1995, Saddam Hussein was 
compelled to acknowledge that he had produced no fewer than 183 biological weapons in 
violation of the Agreement. Since 1998, he has repeatedly attempted to acquire weapons­
grade uranium. He has replaced the original design for a nuclear warhead with a new design 
that could accommodate a Scud missile. Nine such missiles are still unaccounted for in the 
Iraqi inventory. 
When Saddam Hussein attacked the unprotected Kurds in violation of the Agreement. the 
Coalition should have acted , immediately and decisively. But for the same reasons one hears 
now - concern about post-Saddam governance, anxiety among local allies over domestic 
reaction, fear of retaliation - the US could not marshal support for action at that time or at 
any time during the following decade in which Saddam Hussein flagrantly violated the 
Agreement that had allowed him to maintain his dictatorial power over Iraq. Indeed the US 
was barely able to keep the sanctions in place even after Saddam had threatened and ex­
pelled the inspectors. During those years. nothing changed - until 11 September 2001. What 
happened on that day had little to do with Iraq - but a great deal to do with the willingness 
to respond to the ongoing situation in Iraq. 
So those who are looking for a "smoking gun," or for something new in Saddam Hussein's 
behavior that would compel us to act now, or for some link between al-Qaida and Iraq in or­
der to justify a change of regime by force are looking in the wrong place. It is not new evi­
dence that is driving the response now: I for one pray he hasn't been able to get nuclear 
weapons, despite his best efforts. Rather there is a new resolve, and a new urgency. 
Philip Bobbitt, Time to Act, OPEN DEMOCRACY, Jan. 12 , 2003, at http://www.open 
democracy.net/debates/article.jsp?id=2&debateld=88&articleld=882#11; see also Philip 
Bobbitt, Today's War ls Against Tomorrow's Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2003, at Al9 (dis­
cussing the question of military action in Iraq in the light of "Parmenides' Fallacy"). 
34. Bobbitt sees one option of the E.U. - the super-state option - as a pathetic 
attempt to cling to the nation-state: 
It is a failure of imagination . . . to assume that the only thing that will replace the nation­
state is another structure with nation-state-like characteristics, only larger. It is in some ways 
rather pathetic that the visionaries in Brussels can imagine nothing more forward-looking 
than equipping the E.U. with the trappings of the nation-state. 
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of a society of market-states in which law and strategy have begun to 
merge - where war often looks like crime and vice-versa, where 
borders have less to do with defining the State than do more intangi­
ble perimeters like language and technological compatibility"(p. 354). 
What will life be like in the market-state? The legitimating premise 
of the market-state is the maximization of opportunities enjoyed by 
members of society. The market-state uses market incentives to a far 
greater degree than the nation-state, preferring economic incentives to 
the nation-state's reliance on legal regulation. The market-state rec­
ognizes no distinctions of class and is "indifferent to race and ethnicity 
and gender . . . . " (p. 230). In matters of justice, the market-state is 
agnostic: any conception of justice is fine, so long as it "does not act as 
an impediment to economic competition" (p. 230). Opportunity, effi­
ciency, and consumer choice are the central organizing features of the 
market-state. 
Just as the parliamentary nation-state emerged from three possi­
bilities for that constitutional order, so too will the market-state offer 
several variations. The first possibility is an entrepreneurial market­
state (Bobbitt calls a society of such states "The Meadow"). Under this 
model, deregulation and privatization are key features of government. 
These go hand in hand with other policies, which include reduced 
rates of taxation, lower welfare benefits, free trade, and relaxed immi­
gration rules. Security issues are likely to be a paramount concern. 
Life in The Meadow might be best characterized as a permanent state 
of impermanence when it comes to questions of government policy, as 
ad hoc decisionmaking replaces broad and long-range policy agendas. 
A society of states following the second model of the mercantile 
market-state, "The Garden," is more concerned with supporting indus­
try and preserving national and cultural identity. In The Garden, 
strong alliances are forged between government and industry - capi­
tal rather than labor is the focus of domestic fiscal policy. Protection­
ism has a place as well. In matters of culture, ethnic homogeneity and 
welfare are core values. These policies, Bobbitt speculates, will lead to 
less international cooperation between states on matters of security 
and, alarmingly, the proliferation of nuclear and other forms of 
weaponry. 
Lastly is "The Park," devoted to managerial market-states. Life in 
The Park is a high-maintenance affair, akin to contemporary life in the 
Federal Republic of Germany. The economy will be slow to innovate 
and grow: economic efficiency will be sacrificed in favor of social 
cohesion and equality. Aggravating this situation will be continuing 
resistance to liberalization of labor markets in order to protect high­
wage jobs. This could end with no high-wage jobs to protect, but 
P. 234. 
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managerial market-states are more concerned with the quality of life 
. than with growth (entrepreneurial) or market-share (mercantile).35 
The market-state is not a market, and whatever form of govern­
ance develops will entail a diminishing supply of "public goods." 
Doubtless there will be continuing support of institutions without 
which the market cannot function effectively; tangible and intangible 
infrastructure (e.g., education and health) will be even more important 
to the market-state than the nation-state. Nevertheless, market-states 
will have inherent, but unavoidable, weaknesses: among them a lack of 
community, extreme meritocracy, "essential materialism and indiffer­
ence to heroism, spirituality, and tradition" (p. 290). To combat these 
shortcomings, some public goods must come from another source. 
From where will such goods come? 
This precise question was raised by the Archbishop of Canterbury 
who, in a nationally televised speech, suggested that we are living in a 
transitional period, "where the basic assumptions about how states 
work are shifting."36 Taking The Shield of Achilles as his starting point, 
the Archbishop stated that, in his view, "we are witnessing the end of 
the nation state, and the nation state is being replaced in the economi­
cally developed world by what some call the 'market state.' "37 
The Archbishop's televised address was met with considerable 
comment and some criticism. Most critics focused on the Archbishop's 
remarks about the State,38 misunderstanding him to be saying that the 
State is withering away. Bobbitt entered the fray and offered a defense 
of the position, answering critics who missed the most important point 
in the Archbishop's speech: the need for nonstate enterprises to 
provide the public goods no longer nourished by the State.39 
35. David Runciman ties together the problematic aspects of international security and 
Bobbitt's three possible futures for the market-state. See David Runciman, The Garden, the 
Park and the Meadow, LONDON REV. BOOKS, June 6, 200 2, at 7-8. 
· Bobbitt wants to remind us that in a world of states like ours the greatest dangers remain the 
confrontations between the most powerful states, though these in turn should not blind us to 
the possibility of allowing small-scale disputes to escalate into the kind of conflicts that 
overwhelm us. Because this is a world of states, the choice is not between war and peace, but 
between wars that we have anticipated and can manage, and wars that we haven't and can't. 
Id. 
36. Williams, supra note 5. 
37. Id. at 2.  
38. On this point, the Archbishop stated: 
This new form of political administration has in some ways crept up on us, and we need to 
do some hard thinking about how it has happened and what changes are involved for the 
whole idea of being a citizen - not to mention the whole idea of being a politician too. And 
if the analysis I want to offer is right, and these changes are indeed irreversible, we need to 
look at what kind of vacuum is left in our social imagination as a result. 
39. Bobbitt wrote: 
The state is not going away, and in some respects it will be more powerful than ever. Nor 
does the nation state have a monopoly on nationalism; far earlier constitutional orders re­
flected intense nationalism. Rather , Dr. Williams is arguing that the emergence of the mar-
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And what of war? Can we hope that the market-state will usher in 
a new state of peace? Constrained by his reading of historical 
evidence, Bobbitt offers no comfort here. War is a constitutive feature 
of politics: 
There is a widespread view that war is simply a pathology of the State, 
and that healthy states will not fight wars. This view ignores the role 
strategy plays in the formation and continuance of states. War, like law, 
sustains the State by giving it the means to carry out its purposes of pro­
tection, preservation, and defense.40 
In a Postscript to Achilles, Bobbitt speaks of the attacks on New 
York and Washington from the point of view of one who had, for 
some time, anticipated such events. He writes: 
For five centuries only a state could destroy another state. And for five 
centuries, states have developed means of defeating other states. Entire 
worlds of diplomacy, international law, alliances, and naval, air, and land 
warfare are all predicated upon conflicts among states. Only states could 
marshal the resources to threaten the survival of other states; only states 
could organize societies to defend themselves against such threats. Only 
states could bring about peace congresses. 
We are entering a period, however, when very small numbers of persons, 
operating with the enormous power of modern computers, biogenetics, 
air transport, and even small nuclear weapons, can deal lethal blows to 
ket state will see the state evacuate areas of responsibility that it had, in the last 150 years, 
undertaken. When the Left argues for affirmative action, and the Right for criminalising 
abortion; when the Left wants to make hate speech a crime and the Right wants to crimi­
nalise drug use; when the Left seeks to create "hate crimes" and the Right wants to ban non­
national languages: all are regarding the state as a nation-state, employing law and regula­
tion to enforce moral positions. But when the Left urges the deregulation of reproductive 
choice, and the Right the deregulation of industry, they have moved to a market-state per­
spective. Phenomena such as the replacement of conscription with an all-volunteer force, 
welfare reform that attempts to replace unemployment allowances with education and 
training to help the unemployed to enter the labour market, and the use of non­
governmental organisations and private companies as adjuncts to traditional government ac­
tivities, reflect elements of the barely emerging market state. 
And this is the Archbishop's point: that a state that is, owing to these new forces, relatively 
(compared to the nation-state) indifferent to loyalty, civility, trust in authority, respect for 
family life, regard for privacy, reverence for sacrifice, equality and solidarity will require that 
the society it governs promotes these qualities through non-state agencies. As the Arch­
bishop put it: "It is inevitable that governments can no longer deliver in terms of setting out 
a moral basis in law - other institutions will have to take up a new role." This is why he fo­
cuses on "the willingness of the market-state government to engage with traditional religious 
communities in a new way." 
Philip Bobbitt, The Archbishop Is Right: The Nation-State Is Dying, TIMES (LONDON), Dec. 
27, 2002, available at http://www.utexas.edu/law/faculty/pbobbitt/shieldofachilles/archbishop. 
html. 
40. P. 780. Bobbitt goes further, asserting that looking at war as a pathology 
disables us from shaping future wars, as we search, fruitlessly, for the wonder serum that will 
banish war once and for all (or as we plan to fight wars we know - or believe - we can 
win). Yet we can shape future wars, even if we cannot avoid them. We can take decisions 
that will determine whether the next epochal war risks a general cataclysm. 
P. xxvii. 
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any society. Because the origin of these attacks can be effectively dis­
guised, the fundamental bases of the State will change. (p. 811) 
The Long War, which established the strongest model of the 
nation-state, was won with three innovations: weapons of mass 
destruction,41 globalized communications, and international integra­
tion of finance and trade (p. 713). It is a bitter irony that these very 
developments now threaten the peace achieved by the conclusion of 
the Long War. If we are to find our way in what Bobbitt calls a "new 
age of indeterminacy" (p. 816) we must realize that we cannot meet 
the demands of this new age with the nation-state's tools (including 
the international institutions).42 
I mentioned at the outset that Achilles exhibits habits of mind and 
temperament unusual in the academy today. The frame of mind 
exemplified in Achilles also finds expression in Bobbitt's earlier work. 
For example, in Achilles Bobbitt offers us a method of scenario plan­
ning that is crucially different from the model widely used by corpora­
tions.43 Bobbitt's model eschews the four matrix design of the classic 
prisoner's dilemma,44 which has an optimal decision point, in favor of 
holding all facts constant across the scenario suite, varying only for 
human decisions at particular crossroads and offering largely incom­
mensurable - but not incomparable - outcomes. This adamant re­
fusal to select an optimal point derives directly from Tragic Choices. 45 
41. Bobbitt argues that the use of nuclear weapons against Japan was necessary to win 
the peace. 
I have never been persuaded of the moral position of those who would have urged continued 
nonnuclear bombing of the Japanese people for an extended period of months, accepting 
also the American casualties that would have ensued in such an invasion, as preferable to the 
atomic attacks on the two Japanese cities. The only alternative to this carnage would have 
been a half-life for fascism, in a kind of negotiated twilight. And that is precisely what the 
Long War was fought to eliminate. 
P. 678. 
42. One example is the conduct of future wars. 
If we wish to avoid cataclysmic war and invisible, silent war, we shall have to learn how to 
wage wars like the ones in Yugoslavia and Afghanistan, using the tactics of relentless air­
strikes, special forces teams, and indigenous allies. This means, pre-eminently, that we shall 
have to develop rules for intervention. Out of this new epochal conflict can come, some day, 
the consensus that will provide the basis for a constitution for the society of the new form of 
the state. 
P. 782. 
43. See GILL RINGLAND, SCENARIO PLANNING: MANAGING FOR THE FUTURE (1998). 
Bobbitt's model is more akin to that pioneered by Royal Dutch Shell Corporation. See 
SHELL INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM Co., GLOBAL SCENARIOS 1992-2020, at 2 (1992) (pre­
ferring comparison of alternative scenarios to reliance on forecasts or predictions), available 
at http://www.shell.com/static/royal-en/downloads/globalscenarios_l992_2020_partl.pdf. 
44. For discussion, see Stephen Kuhn, Prisoner's Dilemma, in THE STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2001), available at http://plato. 
stanford.edu/entries/prisoner-dilemma/ (last visited July 22, 2003). 
45. See TRAGIC CHOICES, supra note 1 L at 17-28 (describing the methodological ap­
proach of mixing allocation methodologies). 
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Bobbitt also gives us an alternative to the economic determinism 
so evident in Paul Kennedy's The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers.46 
As Richard Overy observes, "[m]uch of The Shield of Achilles is 
devoted to demonstrating that the modern age really has been shaped 
by war and law, which flies defiantly and deliberately in the face of a 
century of Marxist and sub-Marxist belief in the historical force of 
class conflict and systems of production."47 In Achilles, Bobbitt offers 
an account of decisionmaking diametrically opposed to deterministic 
modes of explanation so prevalent in the social sciences. Democracy 
and Deterrence also asserted that economic factors were not funda­
mental drivers of nuclear strategy and that constrained choices could 
nevertheless be crucial.to outcomes.48 In Democracy and Deterrence, 
Bobbitt argued that, contrary to conventional understanding, "ex­
tended deterrence" (the protection of Germany and Japan) and not 
"central deterrence" (the protection of the American homeland) had 
driven the evolution of U.S. nuclear strategy.49 
Constitutional Fate, Bobbitt's first book on constitutional theory, 
presented a fresh approach to the jurisprudence of constitutional law.so 
There, Bobbitt described six forms of constitutional argument.s1 Like 
Democracy and Deterrence, this book's thesis turned things upside 
down. Against the grain of the entire academic debate over the legiti­
macy of judicial review, Bobbitt demonstrated that nothing "grounds" 
our constitutional practices, and that efforts to do so create artificial 
problems that, when the debate is understood, simply go away or are 
dissolved. The search for foundations was, he argued, simply without 
46. PAUL KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS (1989) . 
47. Richard Overy, The New Leviathan?, LITERARY REV., July 2002, at 23. 
48. DEMOCRACY AND DETERRENCE, supra note 12, at 3-6. 
49. Id. at Book I passim. 
50. Many commentators on the book misunderstood Bobbitt's argument. One reviewer 
dismissed it, concluding that "Bobbitt never adequately provides an underlying structure 
that ties his assertions to the other portions of his analysis to form a coherent theory of judi­
cial review." Martin Redish, Judicial Review and Constitutional Ethics, 82 MICH. L. REV. 
665, 679 (1984) (reviewing CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra note 13) . The irony is that one 
could read Constitutional Fate and fail to realize that not only was Bobbitt not advancing a 
new theory of judicial review, he was arguing that the entire debate over the legitimacy of 
judicial review is a pointless enterprise. This misunderstanding continues. But see GUYORA 
BINDER & ROBERT WEISBERG, LITERARY CRITICISMS OF LAW 166-69 (2000) (elaborating 
upon Bobbitt's critique of the problematic presuppositions of the debate over the legitimacy 
of judicial review). 
51. The six forms of argument are: historical (relying on the intentions of the Framers 
and rati�iers of the Constitution); textual (looking to the meaning of the words of the Consti­
tution alone, as they would be understood by the average contemporary "man on the 
street"); structural (inferring rules from relationships that the Constitution mandates among 
the structures it sets up); doctrinal (applying rules generated by precedent); ethical (deriving 
rules from those moral commitments of the American ethos that are reflected in the Consti­
tution); and prudential (seeking to balance the costs and benefits of a particular rule). See 
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra note 13, at 3-136. 
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foundation. The only legitimacy our constitutional practice can have, 
or needs to have, is in the continued employment of the forms of legal 
argument to show the truth and falsity of propositions of constitu­
tional law. Like Tragic Choices, Constitutional Fate is highly influen­
tial: there can scarcely be a law school where the forms of argument 
are not now self-consciously taught.52 Casebooks and judicial opinions 
frequently speak of "structural" or "prudential" arguments as Bobbitt 
described them, or distinguish between historical and textual argu­
ments in the way he taught us, even if the source of these ideas is not 
always apparent.53 
In Constitutional Interpretation, Bobbitt developed a more capa­
cious view of constitutional decisionmaking.54 There he took the forms 
of legal argument, now referred to as "modalities,"55 beyond the 
confines of judicial argument; and showed how other governmental 
actors, for example the President and the Congress, must employ the 
modalities to discharge their constitutional responsibilities,56 whether 
it be for purposes of impeachment, war powers, secession, the 
purchase of Louisiana, or the confirmation of a judge. His clarification 
of our practice of constitutional law also enabled him to show how a 
case can be wrongly decided even by the highest authoritative court, 
an explicit challenge to Legal Realism, which held that law was what 
the highest court declared it to be. More importantly, he demonstrated 
that precedent can be legitimately overruled through modal argument. 
His position thus posed a challenge both to Legal Positivism and 
Dworkinian Constructivism. 
In Constitutional Interpretation, Bobbitt wrote: "Every society has 
a constitution . . . .  the Holy Roman Empire, and the Boy Scouts, la 
Cosa Nostra and the Quakers, the inmates of a prison and the local 
garden club all have constitutions."57 He gives this idea new applica-
52. See Akhil Amar, In Praise of Bobbitt, 72 TEXAS L. REV. 1703, 1704 (1994) ("Bob­
bitt's modalities are key tools . . . .  "). 
53. See, e. g. , THOMAS E. BAKER & JERRE S. WILLIAMS, CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS: 
IN A NUTSHELL 307-336 (2003). But see PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 33 (2000) (citing 
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra note 13, and CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra 
note 13, and enumerating the modalities). 
54. I argued for the general jurisprudential implications of Bobbitt's approach to consti­
tutional law in Dennis Patterson, Conscience and the Constitution, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 270 
(1993) (reviewing CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 13). I show how the mo­
dalities are part of a larger jurisprudence of legal argument in DENNIS PATTERSON, LAW 
AND TRUTH 170-79 (1996), and Dennis Patterson, Normativity and Objectivity in Law, 43 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 325 (2001 ). 
55. For Bobbitt, the modalities are neither true nor false: they are the means by which 
lawyers show the truth of propositions of constitutional law. 
56. See CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 13, at 64-108 (discussing the 
Iran-Contra affair and Robert Bork's confirmation hearing to illustrate the various nonjudi­
cial uses of the modalities). 
57. CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 13, at 64-108. 
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tion, arguing that the society of states has a constitution that achieves 
consensus through epochal warmaking and is memorialized in the con­
stitutions written by the great congresses that follow such wars.58 This 
allows him to argue that the international order is progressively given 
greater definition as it draws on the content of a newly established 
constitutional order, that is, when a particular form achieves domi­
nance.59 
Constitutional Fate left an important question unanswered. Given 
the possibility that the modalities used to show the truth and falsity of 
propositions of constitutional law may conflict, what means do we 
have for deciding which modality should prevail? Bobbitt's solution to 
the problem of choice posed by modal conflict makes two conceptual 
advances: he both solves a theoretical problem in constitutional theory 
and, at the same time, constructs a completely original account of 
choice in law. 
The problem of choice is the occasion for the exercise of the dis­
tinctly human faculty of conscience.60 As Bobbitt wrote in Constitu­
tional Interpretation: "The recursion to conscience is the crucial activ­
ity on which the constitutional system of interpretation . . .  depends."61 
The system of constitutional interpretation depends on conscience be­
cause it is through the exercise of conscience that we show our 
values.62 It is by creating a space for conscience - not banishing it in 
the face of a particular theory of justice - that a system is just.63 
58. P. x. For example, the treaties of Versailles, Utrecht, and Vienna. 
59. Bobbitt even sorts out the various schools of contemporary international law into 
the "modalities" of constitutional law that he first described in Constitutional Fate. Pp. 660-
61. 
60. Bobbitt discusses conscience in Achilles in connection with the thought of Hobbes 
and Carl Schmitt. P. 596. 
61.  CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 13, at 184. 
62. Id. at 183-86. 
63. Constilll tional Interpretation is the first account of legal practice from a religious 
point of view. The parallel with Wittgenstein's argument in the Tractatus is clear. Wittgen­
stein once said "I cannot help seeing every problem from a religious point of view." M. O'C 
Drury, Some Notes on Conversations with Wittgenstein, in LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN: 
PERSONAL RECOLLECTIONS 79 (Rush Rhees ed., 1 984). In the Tractalm, Wittgenstein set 
out to describe a certain metaphysical relationship between language and reality. For Witt­
genstein, truth is something that is "shown" rather than "said." He regarded the most impor­
tant part of his endeavor to be that about which he said almost nothing: the mystical. This is 
indicated in the final, cryptic passage: "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in 
silence." LUDWIG WrrrGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS 7 (David Pears & 
Brian McGuinness trans., 1961).  For Bobbitt, the most important aspect of constitutional 
practice is neither how it is conducted (i.e., the modalities) nor our attempts to theorize it. 
Rather, the existence of conscience shows God's presence in the world. This is the most sig­
nificant dimension of modal conflict (seen from the religious point of view). 
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From Tragic Choices to Democracy and Deterrence through 
Nuclear Strategy, to two sublime works in constitutional theory64 and 
now The Shield of Achilles, Bobbitt has consistently returned to the 
same territory (albeit from a variety of vantage points): human 
choice.65 Whether it be that of the solitary individual (e.g., a judge 
deciding a case) or a nation considering its options in a time of crisis, it 
is the defining characteristic of human existence. However one under­
stands the meaning of Bobbitt's conception of conscience, it cannot be 
a matter of applying a moral calculus or decision procedure of one 
kind or another. We do not choose our values; we make choices and, 
in doing so, exhibit our values.66 In this sense, choice is the matrix from 
which we discover and recreate the ethical.67 
Achilles is a brilliant and astonishing book. As the European 
Union's Commissioner for External Affairs wrote: "We are all about 
to have our way of looking at the world turned upside down by a 
superb book."68 To describe Bobbitt's accomplishment, it is tempting 
to invoke Bernard Bailyn's insightful definition of "the modern 
creative historian" as someone who provides "a whole area of histori­
cal investigation by redirecting it from established channels into new 
directions, unexplored directions, so that what was once dark, vague 
or altogether unperceived is suddenly flooded with light and the 
possibilities of a new way of understanding are suddenly revealed."69 
Bobbitt has done so with admirable skill and daring. 
It will be decades and more before we know the answer to Paul 
Kennedy's surmise that "Achilles may . . .  become a classic to later 
64. When asked by the legal affairs columnist Stuart Taylor to recommend the best 
book on judicial review in the last twenty years, Laurence Tribe wrote, "There are two, and 
they're both by the same author," recommending Bobbitt's Constitutional Fate, and Consti­
tutional Interpretation. E-mail from Stuart Taylor, to Dennis Patterson (Feb. 18, 2003) (on 
file with author). 
65. In explicitly religious language, Bobbitt wrote: "Decision according to law is an 
ideal, but it is also an art and finally it is our piety, our 'service to God.' " CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION, supra note 13, at 186, citing and quoting FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, Preface 
to Second Edition, THE GAY SCIENCE (2d ed. 1887). 
66. For Bobbitt, one of these values is faith. He once wrote: "It seems that whenever I 
.sat down to write about making decisions, I found I was writing about faith; and when I 
wrote about faith, it became something about making decisions.'' Philip Bobbitt, What I 
Write, Lecture at the Johnson Library (Jan. 21, 2003) (transcript on file with author). 
67. Wittgenstein expresses a similar view. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Lecture 011 Ethics, 
in PHILOSOPHICAL OCCASIONS 37, 38 (James c. Klagge & Alfred Nordmann eds., 1 993) 
("Now I am going to use the term Ethics in a slightly wider sense, in a sense in fact which 
includes what I believe to be the most essential part of what is generally called Aesthetics.''); 
see also S0REN KIERKEGAARD, 1 CONCLUDING UNSCIENTIFIC POSTSCRIPT TO 
PHILOSOPHICAL FRAGMENTS 33 (Howard v. Hong & Edna H. Hong trans., J 992) ("All de­
cision . . .  is rooted in subjectivity.''). 
68. Patten, supra note 6, at 1 .  
69. BERNARD BAILYN, HISTORY AND THE CREATIVE IMAGINATION 4 (1985). 
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generations."7° For now, we are already assured by none other than Sir 
Michael Howard that it will become "[o]ne of the most important 
works on international relations [in] the last fifty years."71 But if you 
ever wonder what works from our era will be read as The Prince72 or 
Leviathan73 are read, think of The Shield of Achilles. 74 
70. Paul Kennedy, Th e Modern Machiavelli, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Nov. 7, 2002, at 52, 55. 
71 . Michael Howard, Advance Praise (back cover) for Ach illes. 
72. Kennedy, supra note 70. 
73. See Overy, supra note 47. 
74. See Caryl Haskins, Advance Praise (back cover) for HENRY KISSINGER, NUCLEAR 
WEAPONS AND FOREIGN POLICY (1957) (calling it "the work of authentic genius"), which 
addressed for the post-World War II generation how statecraft would have to come to terms 
with nuclear deterrence. 
